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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jamison Lahman
210d11aa5d chore(devcontainer): pre-seed known_hosts, install build-essentials (#10266) 2026-04-16 12:29:37 -07:00
6 changed files with 39 additions and 2 deletions

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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
FROM ubuntu:26.04@sha256:cc925e589b7543b910fea57a240468940003fbfc0515245a495dd0ad8fe7cef1
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential \
curl \
default-jre \
fd-find \
@@ -61,3 +62,11 @@ RUN chsh -s /bin/zsh root && \
echo '[ -f /workspace/.devcontainer/zshrc ] && . /workspace/.devcontainer/zshrc' >> "$rc"; \
done && \
chown dev:dev /home/dev/.zshrc
# Pre-seed GitHub's SSH host keys so git-over-SSH never prompts. Keys are
# pinned in-repo (verified against the fingerprints GitHub publishes at
# https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/githubs-ssh-key-fingerprints)
# rather than fetched at build time, so a compromised build-time network can't
# inject a rogue key.
COPY github_known_hosts /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
RUN chmod 644 /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts

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@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
{
"name": "Onyx Dev Sandbox",
"image": "onyxdotapp/onyx-devcontainer@sha256:0f02d9299928849c7b15f3b348dcfdcdcb64411ff7a4580cbc026a6ee7aa1554",
"runArgs": ["--cap-add=NET_ADMIN", "--cap-add=NET_RAW", "--network=onyx_default"],
"image": "onyxdotapp/onyx-devcontainer@sha256:4986c9252289b660ce772b45f0488b938fe425d8114245e96ef64b273b3fcee4",
"runArgs": [
"--cap-add=NET_ADMIN",
"--cap-add=NET_RAW",
"--network=onyx_default"
],
"mounts": [
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.claude,target=/home/dev/.claude,type=bind",
"source=${localEnv:HOME}/.claude.json,target=/home/dev/.claude.json,type=bind",

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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
github.com ssh-rsa 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
github.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBEmKSENjQEezOmxkZMy7opKgwFB9nkt5YRrYMjNuG5N87uRgg6CLrbo5wAdT/y6v0mKV0U2w0WZ2YB/++Tpockg=
github.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOMqqnkVzrm0SdG6UOoqKLsabgH5C9okWi0dh2l9GKJl

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@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@ set -euo pipefail
echo "Setting up firewall..."
# Reset default policies to ACCEPT before flushing rules. On re-runs the
# previous invocation's DROP policies are still in effect; flushing rules while
# the default is DROP would block the DNS lookups below. Register a trap so
# that if the script exits before the DROP policies are re-applied at the end,
# we fail closed instead of leaving the container with an unrestricted
# firewall.
trap 'iptables -P INPUT DROP; iptables -P OUTPUT DROP; iptables -P FORWARD DROP' EXIT
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT
# Only flush the filter table. The nat and mangle tables are managed by Docker
# (DNS DNAT to 127.0.0.11, container networking, etc.) and must not be touched —
# flushing them breaks Docker's embedded DNS resolver.
@@ -34,8 +45,16 @@ ALLOWED_DOMAINS=(
"pypi.org"
"files.pythonhosted.org"
"go.dev"
"proxy.golang.org"
"sum.golang.org"
"storage.googleapis.com"
"dl.google.com"
"static.rust-lang.org"
"index.crates.io"
"static.crates.io"
"archive.ubuntu.com"
"security.ubuntu.com"
"deb.nodesource.com"
)
for domain in "${ALLOWED_DOMAINS[@]}"; do

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@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ repos:
hooks:
- id: ripsecrets
args:
- --strict-ignore
- --additional-pattern
- ^sk-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{20,}$

1
.secretsignore Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
.devcontainer/github_known_hosts